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MASTERCARD INT'L INC. V. NADER PRIMARY
COMM., INC.
2004 WL 434404, 2004 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 3644 (2004)
I. INTRODUCTION
MasterCard International Inc. ("MasterCard"), a financial
services company, sued presidential candidate Ralph Nader and his
political committees (collectively "Nader") in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging nine
violations of the Lanham Act, the Copyright Act, and New York
State and common law.' The nine counts arose from Nader's use
of two of MasterCard's service marks: (1) "There are some things
money can't buy. For everything else, there's MasterCard," and
(2) "Priceless. 2 Specifically, MasterCard claimed that Nader used
these service marks to suggest that his 2000 run for the President
of the United States was endorsed by MasterCard.3
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff MasterCard is a large financial organization consisting
of more than 23,000 banks, foreign member institutions, and
domestic member institutions that engage in funding transactions
by credit and debit payment cards.4 Defendant Ralph Nader was a
candidate in the November 2000 presidential election.' Since
1997, MasterCard has utilized a series of advertisements known as
the "Priceless Advertisements" (the "Priceless Ads"). These
advertisements feature the names, descriptions, and prices of
certain goods and services purchased by individuals.6  The
1. MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 2004 WL
434404, * 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id. at *2.
4. Id. at*1.
5. Id.
6. Id. at*1.
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Priceless Ads end with an expression identifying some priceless
intangible that cannot be bought with money.7 This is followed by
the phrase: "Priceless. There are some things money can't buy, for
everything else there's MasterCard."8
In August of 2000, MasterCard discovered that Nader allegedly
broadcast a similar advertisement on television, endorsing himself
for president (the "Nader Ad").9 Television stations broadcast this
advertisement from August 6-17, 2000, during the presidential
campaign. ° The Nader Ad could also be viewed on Nader's
website throughout the campaign." The Nader Ad included a
series of objects displaying the price of each.12 It then ended with
a phrase identifying a priceless intangible that could not be bought
with money. 3 Specifically, the phrase read, "finding out the truth
- priceless. There are some things that money can't buy."' 4
After viewing the ad, MasterCard sent Nader a letter and
contacted them via telephone explaining its concern over the
similarity of the advertisements.' 5 MasterCard suggested that
Nader stop broadcasting the ad because of its similarity to
MasterCard's own Priceless ads. 6 Nader refused.'7 The parties
could not reach an agreement, and consequently, MasterCard sued
on August 16, 2000.8 The complaint included the following
counts: trademark infringement in violation of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, trademark infringement in violation of Section 32(1)
of the Lanham Act, trademark infringement of New York
Common Law Trademark Rights, 9 trademark dilution in violation
7. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at * 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at * 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The Court granted Defendants summary judgment on the New York state
244 [Vol. XV: 243
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss1/9
MASTERCARD INT'L INC.
of Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act; trademark dilution under New
York law, 20 copyright infringement in violation of the Copyright
Act, unfair competition and misappropriation under New York
common law,2 ' and deceptive trade practices under New York
common law. MasterCard then sought a preliminary injunction
during the 2000 presidential campaign which was denied by the
Court. 3  Subsequently, Nader filed a motion for summary
judgment on all nine counts. 4
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Part A of this analysis will address MasterCard's trademark
infringement claim, analyzing whether Nader violated Sections
43(a) and 32(1) of the Lanham Act. Next, Part B will address
MasterCard's trademark dilution claim, analyzing whether Nader
violated Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. Finally, Part C will
address MasterCard's claims of copyright infringement and fair
law claim of trademark infringement. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *5.
20. The Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' state law dilution claim. Id. at *9.
21. The Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment of
Plaintiffs' state law claims of unfair competition and misappropriation under
New York common law as those claims are dismissed by federal copyright act.
Id. at * 10. Specifically, MasterCard's advertisements clearly fall within the
subject matter of copyright as defined by § 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act
and are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified in Section 106." Id. at *5.
22. The Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment of
plaintiffs' claim of deceptive trade practices in violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law
§ 349. Id. at * 16. In order to sustain a Section 349 claim, plaintiffs' must show
that defendant intentionally deceived consumers. Id. Here, the Court reasoned
the Nader advertisement was not being used in connection with the promotion
of a product or service. Instead, the Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' marks is
political in nature. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *16.
23. Id. at*1.
24. Id. Summary Judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).
2004] 245
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use in violation of the Copyright Act.
A. Trademark Infringement- Sections 43(a) and 32(1) of the
Lanham Act
The court first addressed MasterCard's allegations that Nader
violated Sections 43(a) and 32(1) of the Trademark Act.25
Applying the eight factor balancing test articulated in Polaroid
Corporation v. Polarad Electric Corporation,26 the court looked to
see whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the
Priceless Ads and the Nader ad.27 In analyzing the strength of the
25. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *2. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
reads:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities .... , shall be liable in a civil action by
any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2005).
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act reads:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant
(a) use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be
liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005).
26. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
27. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *3. The Eight Factors articulated in
Polaroid are:
(1) strength of the Plaintiff's mark; (2) degree of similarity
246 [Vol. XV: 243
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mark, the court reasoned that MasterCard must have established
either that the mark was inherently distinctive or that the mark had
an acquired secondary meaning.28 MasterCard argues that its mark
had achieved a secondary meaning. 9 Nader conceded this point,
saying that the Priiceless Ads were so inherent in present-day
American pop culture that they had acquired a secondary
meaning.3" Thus, in holding that the strength of MasterCard's
mark was indisputable, the court weighed this factor in
MasterCard's favor.3'
Next, in determining the similarity of the marks, the court
considered whether the two marks created the same overall
advertisement impact when viewed separately. 2  Nader again
agreed that the Nader ad used the term "priceless" in the same way
MasterCard used the term in its television ads.33 In addition, Nader
did not dispute that they used the phrase "there are some things
money can't buy" in the same commercial context as did
MasterCard.34 Thus, in holding that both marks created the same
overall advertisement impact, the court weighed this second factor
in MasterCard's favor.35
In analyzing the third and fourth factors, the court considered
whether there was any likelihood that MasterCard, a financial
institution, would have any direct participation or involvement in
between the two marks; (3) proximity of the products or
services; (4) likelihood that the prior owner will "bridge the
gap" into the newcomer's product or service line; (5) evidence
of actual confusion between the marks; (6) whether the
defendant adopted the mark in good faith; (7) the quality of
defendants' products or services; and (8) sophistication of the
consumers.
Id. (citing Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495).
28. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *3.
35. Id.
2004] 247
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financially supporting a presidential candidate in the 2000
election.36 Here, the court noted that there was little similarity
between MasterCard's financial services business and Nader's
political candidacy. 7 Furthermore, the court reasoned that neither
Nader nor his committees had demonstrated any desire to enter the
financial services business or make any offerings to the public
regarding credit or debit cards. 8 Thus, the court held that both the
third and fourth factors weighed in Nader's favor.39
Next, in determining the evidence of actual confusion among the
public, the court examined whether there was an occurrence of
actual confusion and mistakes." The court specifically noted that
out of 452 e-mails to MasterCard from consumers regarding the
Nader ad, only two could possibly demonstrate consumer
confusion.4' MasterCard also relied on a written transcript of
CNN's Late Edition program, in which Connecticut Senator
Christopher Dodd stated that he thought the Nader ad was a credit
card ad.42 However, the court reasoned that a tape of the CNN
program showed Senator Dodd laughing at his own joke,
demonstrating that this was not evidence of actual confusion.43
Since plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that
reasonable people would be confused by the Nader ad, the court
held this factor weighed in Nader's favor."
In determining the sixth factor, the court considered whether
Nader intended "to palm off his products as those of another. 4 5 In
pointing to the uncontested testimony that neither Nader nor his
committees had any intent to imply that he was endorsed for the
presidency by MasterCard, the court here held that there was no
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *4.
248 [Vol. XV: 243
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evidence that Nader intended to confuse the public.46 Thus, this
factor again weighed in Nader's favor.
Regarding the seventh factor, the court noted that the quality of
Nader's products or services was of little weight in this case as
there was no reasonable comparison to be made between
MasterCard's financial services and Nader's political values and
agendas. 8 Thus, the quality of Nader's product did not factor into
the court's analysis.
Finally, in analyzing the eighth factor, the court held that it w. .
reasonable to conclude that the general American public is
sophisticated enough to distinguish Nader's Ad used for political
purposes with MasterCard's financial services ad used for
commercial purposes.49 The court reasoned that there was little
opportunity to confuse these two advertisements." Thus, the court
weighed this factor in Nader's favor."
To properly analyze the eight Polaroid factors, the court viewed
each in light of the totality of the circumstances. 2 After balancing
the Polaroid factors, the court held that MasterCard failed to
establish a likelihood of confusion, as required to support a
trademark infringement claim. 3  Specifically, there was no
genuine issue of material fact with regard to any likelihood of
confusion between the Priceless Ads and the Nader Ad that could
comprise a violation of the Lanham Act. 4 Thus, Nader was
granted summary judgment on the federal trademark infringement
claims.5
46. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *4.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Furthermore, the Court granted Defendants' summary judgment on
the New York state law claim of trademark infringement. Id. Similar to the
Lanham Act, under New York common law, MasterCard had to show a
likelihood of confusion between the two products in order to succeed. Id. Here,
2004] 249
7
Devine: Mastercard Int'l Inc. v. Nader Primary Comm., Inc. 2004 WL 434404
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART & ENT. LAW [Vol. XV: 243
B. Trademark Dilution -- Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act 6
Next, the court addressed MasterCard's allegation of trademark
dilution. 7 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act protects against
the unauthorized use of marks that impairs the goodwill and value
of the plaintiffs mark. 8 However, the Act specifically excludes
from its coverage noncommercial uses of a mark.59 Thus, prior to
addressing whether Nader actually diluted MasterCard's marks
under federal law, the Court first determined whether Nader's use
of the mark was commercial.6"
In determining whether Nader's use of the mark was
commercial in nature, the court reasoned that the Nader Ad did not
sell products or services, was not designed to entice customers to
the Court reasoned that MasterCard failed to show a genuine issue of material
fact as to a likelihood of confusion between MasterCard's financial services and
Nader's 2000 political campaign. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *5.
56. Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act reads:
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled .... to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief
as is provided in this subsection.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous
mark;
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark;
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2005).
57. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *6.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *7. Section 1125(c)(4) provides that "the following shall not be
actionable under this section:.. .noncommercial use of a mark." Id.
60. Id.
250
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buy products or services, and did not propose any kind of
commercial transaction.61  Although the Nader Ad ran on
television before a large amount of contributions were given to his
presidential campaign, MasterCard offered no evidence of a causal
connection between the ad and the large amount of contribution
money received.6 2
The court reasoned further that even if there was evidence of a
causal connection between the Nader Ad and the large amount of
contributions, the speech would still not be considered
commercial.63 Specifically, the court noted that the Nader Ad was
a strong political message which expressed his personal opinion on
presidential campaigning.' Furthermore, the court reasoned that
the legislative history of the Lanham Act clearly indicates that
Congress did not intend for the Act to chill political speech by
deeming parts of it commercial.65 Thus, the court held that this
speech was political, rather than commercial in nature as
defendants' solicitation of contributions was more than a
commercial transaction.66  The speech was part of Nader's
communicative message, in the context of expressing political
speech.67 Subsequently, Nader's use of MasterCard's trademarks
was exempted from coverage by the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act.68 Once again, Nader's summary judgment motion was
granted.69
61. Id.
62. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *8.
67. Id.
68. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *9. Furthermore, even if Nader's use
of MasterCard's trademarks could be deemed commercial in nature, this use
would not dilute the MasterCard's marks. Id. at *8. Here, the Court reasoned
that there was no evidence in the record that defendants' use of plaintiff's marks
actually caused dilution of the distinctiveness of plaintiff's marks. Id.
69. Id. at *9. Additionally, the Court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs' state law dilution claim. Id. In its reasoning,
the Court noted that there was no evidence that defendants' use of plaintiffs'
2004]
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C. Copyright Infringement and Fair Use
In response to MasterCard's claim of copyright infringement,
defendants argue that the Nader Ad was a fair use of the Priceless
Ads.7" The court in fact reasoned that the Nader Ad was a parody
of the Priceless ads.7" The Copyright Act provides that the use or
reproduction of a copyrighted work is "not an infringement of a
copyright" if it is used "for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research."" In
determining whether the Nader Ad was a fair use of the Priceless
Ads, the court had to consider four non-exclusive factors
articulated by the Supreme Court in Harper & Row v. Nation Inc.73
These factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work.7 4
In Harper & Row, the Court noted that the most important factor
in determining fair use is the effect on the market.75 In assessing
this factor, the Court examined the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.76 Here, the
marks created even a likelihood of dilution of such marks. Id. Furthermore,
there was no evidence that defendants' limited and political use of plaintiffs'
marks could weaken those marks' ability to serve as a unique identifier of
plaintiffs' goods or services. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *9.
70. Id. at *10.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *10; see 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2005).
73. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *10; see Harper & Row v. Nation Ent.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
74. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *10; see 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (2005).
75. Harper, 471 U.S. at 566.
76. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at * 15.
252
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court found that while the Nader Ad may serve a general
overlapping market with MasterCard, it serves an entirely different
purpose than the Priceless Ads.77 Specifically, the Nader Ad had a
political non-commercial purpose." Thus, the court held this
factor weighed heavily in Nader's favor.79
In deciding the second factor, the court reasoned that the most
important question was whether the allegedly infringing work
"merely supercedes" the original work "or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message."" ° Here, the court
noted that the Nader Ad does add something new, thus altering
MasterCard's ads; the underlying messages in the two
advertisements were different.' Specifically, as MasterCard's
underlying message in its advertisements is that MasterCard is the
best way to pay for anything that is commercially transactable, the
Nader Ad portrays the harsh reality of Presidential policies and
politics and contrasts Nader's "truth" as the remedy for the
political falsities and politicians' bought and paid for positions.82
The Court further reasoned that the Nader Ad was a parody for
purposes of fair use analysis, as Nader had his own message while
knowingly commenting on the design of the original.83
In analyzing the third factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the court considered whether the original work was creative as
opposed to factual, as well as whether the work has been
previously published. 4 Here, the court reasoned that the creative
nature of the Priceless Ads placed these advertisements in the
"core of intended copyright protection."85  However, the court
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *12 (Citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994)).
81. Id. at *13.
82. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at * 13.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *14.
85. Id. at *14 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
20041 253
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noted that giving this factor undue weight in a fair use analysis
would prevent findings of fair use that advance science and art
through criticism or commentary.86 Thus, the court held that this
factor does not weigh in either MasterCard's or Nader's favor as it
has little relevance to the analysis.87
Finally, in assessing the fourth factor, the court focused on the
protected phrases of the Priceless Ads.88 In examining the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole, the court reasoned that the greater part of the
Nader Ad was original.89 Specifically, the narration, supertitles,
and film imagery were very different from the Priceless Ads.9"
Further, the substance of these messages was diverse.9 Thus, the
court held this factor weighed in Nader's favor.92
After balancing the factors pertinent to the finding of fair use,
the court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact,
as the Nader Ad was a fair use parody of MasterCard's Priceless
ads under the Copyright Act.93 The court thus granted Nader's
motion for summary judgment.94
IV. CONCLUSION
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted Nader's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.95
Specifically, the court granted summary judgment to claims of
trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, trademark
infringement of New York Common Law Trademark Rights,
trademark dilution in violation of Section 43(c) of the Lanham
86. Id. at * 14.
87. Id.
88. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *14.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. MasterCard, 2004 WL 434404 at *14.
95. Id. at *16.
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Act, trademark dilution under New York law, copyright
infringement in violation of the Copyright Act, unfair competition,
and misappropriation and deceptive trade practices under New
York common law.96
Kate Devine
96. Id. at *1.
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